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ABSTRACT
Recently exposed vulnerabilities reveal the necessity to im-
prove the security of branch predictors. Branch predictors
record history about the execution of different programs, and
such information from different processes are stored in the
same structure and thus accessible to each other. This leaves
the attackers with the opportunities for malicious training and
malicious perception. Instead of flush-based or physical iso-
lation of hardware resources, we want to achieve isolation of
the content in these hardware tables with some lightweight
processing using randomization as follows. (1) Content en-
coding. We propose to use hardware-based thread-private
random numbers to encode the contents of the branch predic-
tor tables (both direction and destination histories) which we
call XOR-BP. Specifically, the data is encoded by XOR opera-
tion with the key before written in the table and decoded after
read from the table. Such a mechanism obfuscates the infor-
mation adding difficulties to cross-process or cross-privilege
level analysis and perception. It achieves a similar effect
of logical isolation but adds little in terms of space or time
overheads. (2) Index encoding. We propose a randomized
index mechanism of the branch predictor (Noisy-XOR-BP).
Similar to the XOR-BP, another thread-private random num-
ber is used together with the branch instruction address as
the input to compute the index of the branch predictor. This
randomized indexing mechanism disrupts the correspondence
between the branch instruction address and the branch pre-
dictor entry, thus increases the noise for malicious perception
attacks. Our analyses using an FPGA-based RISC-V proces-
sor prototype and additional auxiliary simulations suggest
that the proposed mechanisms incur a very small performance
cost while providing strong protection.
1. INTRODUCTION
In modern processors, branch prediction is crucial in effec-
tively exploiting parallelism of sequential programs for high-
performance execution. However, recently exposed vulnera-
bilities reveal the necessity to improve the security of branch
predictors in mainstream commercial processors [1,11,14,27].
Take Spectre V2 vulnerability [27] as an example: Through
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purposeful training of the branch predictors, an adversary
can change the control flow of a victim to incorrect specula-
tive paths which in turn reveals unauthorized data. Another
example is the BranchScope attack [14], where history in-
formation in the branch predictor can be perceived by the
attacker to infer sensitive data after the victim has executed.
The root cause of these vulnerabilities is that modern proces-
sors generally adopt the design principle of resource sharing,
and branch predictor is one of the typical examples. From a
security perspective, resource sharing means a possible attack
surface. Branch predictors record history about the execution
of different programs, and such information from different
processes is stored in the same structure and thus accessible
to each other. This leaves the attackers with the opportunities
for malicious training and malicious perception.
One kind of defensive idea is to avoid letting key instruc-
tions leave traces in the branch predictors. For example, one
countermeasure [3] is to convert secret-dependent branch
instructions into indirect jumps or other computation in-
structions to prevent the leakage of sensitive information.
As another example, Intel processors allow software to set
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS to 1 after a transition to a more
privileged predictor mode [21]. Predicted targets of indirect
branches executed in that predictor mode cannot be set by
execution in a less privileged predictor mode. However, it
is difficult to guarantee full coverage of sensitive branches
through manual or automated analyses.
In contrast, isolation is a fundamental way to improve
the security of branch predictors. Existing proposals can be
largely separated into two categories. ¬ Logical isolation
aims at preventing attacks on the shared hardware resource.
Attaching the thread ID to each entry can help eliminate ma-
licious reuse across threads. But it cannot avoid contention.
Another mechanism is to flush the whole history table each
time a context switch or privilege switch (e.g., system call).
Evtyushkin et al. proposed to do so by software method [13].
Clearly, this approach introduces a large context switching
cost (e.g., 1.2ms per switch in the experiment). Naturally,
hard-wiring flush support can bring the cost of flushing down,
which was simulated by Sangho et al. [28]. Even with low-
ered costs to perform the flush operation, decrease of the
performance benefits of branch predictors is yet another cost,
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which becomes significant in SMT architectures. ­ Physical
isolation can be implemented by allocating separate branch
tables for different threads or privilege levels. BRB [43] is a
state-of-art hardware implementation that provides individual
history tables for different programs. Although BRB tries
to limit hardware cost, it is in general impractical to assign
separate tables to all threads and privilege level combinations.
Also, physical isolation alone is insufficient as storage is still
multiplexed in time by different threads.
In short, existing methods are not satisfactory. We thus set
out to seek a more lightweight solution that achieves isolation
of the content with similar or better qualities than these prior
approaches. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the
first to propose the XOR-based lightweight isolation mech-
anism for branch predictors, which can effectively prevent
branch-predictor induced malicious code execution and pre-
vent spying on the history information of branch predictors.
Our approach has the advantage of simple implementations
and better suitability for SMT architecture than predictor
flushing upon context switch. It is also more cost effective
than private predictors or hardware backups. Overall, this
paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a lightweight XOR-based Isolation mech-
anism (XOR-BP) for branch predictors. Upon context
switch or privilege changes, the hardware dynamically
generates a new thread-private random number. When
updating the branch predictor (direction and/or address),
the predictor’s update is XORed with the thread-private
random number before saved to the table. Similarly,
when reading the predictor table, the current random
number will be used again to decode the stored result.
By changing the thread-private random number period-
ically (upon context switch or privilege changes), this
lightweight mechanism effectively achieves content-
level isolation among multiple threads.
• We propose a randomized index mechanism of the
branch predictor (Noisy-XOR-BP). Based on the XOR-
BP, another thread-private random number is used to-
gether with the branch instruction address as the input to
compute the index of the branch predictor. This random-
ized indexing mechanism disrupts the correspondence
between the branch instruction address and the branch
predictor entry, thus increases the noise for malicious
perceived attacks.
• We present a detailed evaluation for our proposed de-
signs. For single-threaded core, we implemented the
above isolation mechanisms on an FPGA prototyping
system of a RISC-V out-of-order processor for a real-
istic evaluation of the performance impact. For SMT
microarchitectures, we modeled and evaluated the iso-
lation mechanisms on a Gem5-based simulator, and we
investigate its performance impacts for different branch
predictors, including the latest TAGE_SC_L [40] pre-
dictors.
In the following, we analyze existing attacks on branch
predictors (Section 2); discuss the threat model (Section 3);
introduce the defense strategy (Section 4) and the design
details of the countermeasure (Section 5); analyze the perfor-
mance impacts (Section 6); summarize related work (Section
7); and conclude this paper (Section 8);
2. UNDERSTANDING ATTACKS VIA BRANCH
PREDICTORS
2.1 Two types of attacks due to resource shar-
ing
Conventional branch predictor design allows different pro-
cesses to use the same hardware resources for branch pre-
diction. This creates side channel just like those exploited
in a cache based side channel attack. it allows the attacker
to prime the predictor in a certain fashion to facilitate the
revelation of a victim’s sensitive information. Additionally,
the attacker can achieve malicious training in order to in-
fluence the victim’s (speculative) execution, which in turn
enables or enhances the victim’s information leak. A number
of different types of attacks have been constructed:
(1) Reuse based attacks: In structures such as PHT (Pat-
tern History Table), different programs directly access the
common resource. Entries set by one process influence an-
other. This type of attack is therefore analogous to reuse
based cache attacks [31]. There are three typical examples.
¬ BranchScope attack [14]: An attacker first locates the
shared PHT entry of the secret-dependent branch of the victim
and sets its saturating counter to a specific state, such as Weak
Taken. The contents of the branch predictor are updated
after the victim’s target branch instruction is executed. After
switching back to the attacker’s program, the victim’s update
to the branch predictor manifests as a measurable difference
in execution time. The attacker can thus sense the direction
of the target instruction and infer the victim’s execution path.
­ Pure malicious training like Spectre V1 and V2 [27]:
Instead of exploiting the side channel of predictor to obtain
leaked information, an attacker carefully trains the shared
predictor, either PHT or BTB, to induce victim thread into
incorrect speculative paths which in turn reveals unauthorized
data via cache side channel.
® Branch Shadowing attack [28] makes a shadow of victim
code and measures whether target address in BTB left by
victim branch accelerates the execution of shadow branch, by
which the attacker can observe the direction of victim branch
in SGX.
(2) Contention based attacks: In structures more similar
to a cache, such as the BTB, an attack similar to contention
based cache attack can be mounted. One condition for con-
structing such attacks is that contention result in eviction of
the old record. An attacker can learn about the execution of
the target branch instructions of a victim by sensing whether
contention happens or not for the corresponding entry of
branch prediction table. Because different branches in typi-
cal PHT use and update the same table, rather than evicting
others’ history, there is no contention based attacks.
In an SBPA attack [1, 2], the attacker first occupies all
the entries in the same set (multiple ways) in the BTB cor-
responding to the victim’s target branch instruction. When
the victim executes, the target branch will have a BTB miss
and thus predicted as Not Taken. According to the BTB’s
update mechanism, the BTB will be updated if and only if
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the target branch is Taken. An update of the BTB will evict
an entry primed by the attacker, resulting in measurable dif-
ference of execution time, thus allowing the attacker to learn
the execution results of the target branch of the victim.
An attacker can traverse its own address space and measur-
ing execution time to infer the eviction of its branch from the
BTB. In the case where only one branch is routinely evicted,
then the victim must have a branch with the same index and
(partial) tag. This allows the attacker to infer virtual addresses
of other threads and break KASLR [12].
In summary, the fundamental source of these attacks is
that current branch predictors do not have thorough isolation
between different processes and privileges.
2.2 Common steps for attacks on branch pre-
dictor
By analyzing these two types of attacks, the following
common steps can be observed during a typical attack:
Step 1: Locate phase. An attacker first needs to locate
the entry of branch predictor for the victim’s target branch
instruction. Given the rather fixed indexing design of typical
predictor implementation, this is relatively straightforward.
Step 2: Prime phase. Next, the attacker needs to prepare
state for the target entry. This includes priming the whole
set in order to sense eviction; or set a particular value in
order to achieve either malicious training, or to permit future
observation of the content changes due to the execution of
the target branch.
Step 3: Probe phase (optional). After the target branch
is executed, if the attacker is to obtain information about the
target branch, it needs to probe the status of the target entry,
usually via execution time analysis.
3. THREAT MODEL
This paper has the following assumptions: The attacker
thread and the victim thread can run on the same processor
core. An attacker can know the source code and address
layout of the victim. An attacker has the ability to run the
victim program in single-step mode [14].
This paper focuses on the defense against the reuse based
attacks and the contention based attacks, which cause mali-
cious training, priming, and perception across different pro-
cesses and privileges. In addition, branch predictors may also
have side-channel leakage in the event of a mis-prediction.
It should be noted, however, misprediction and thus mis-
speculation are perhaps inevitable. This paper does not con-
sider the defense against all speculative execution related
vulnerabilities.
A typical branch predictor consists of a set of history/pat-
tern tables, which work together to predict the direction of a
conditional branch (Pattern History Table, or PHT), the ad-
dresses of indirect branches (Branch Target Buffer, or BTB),
and the addresses of function return instructions (Return Ad-
dress Stack, or RAS). Many commercial processors have
adopted a thread-private RAS structure for SMT core, but
they still use a shared design for PHT and BTB [23]. There-
fore, this paper mainly studies how to isolate PHT and BTB.
Nevertheless, our proposed methods still apply to shared
RAS.
4. DEFENSE STRATEGY
This paper focuses on securing branch predictors against
the reuse based and contention based attacks. As can be seen
from the analysis in Section 2, these attacks primarily exploit
the design vulnerability that branch predictors allow concur-
rent and fine-grain shared accesses from multiple threads and
multiple privilege spaces. Our approach is to provide suffi-
cient isolation in the predictor between threads or privilege
levels. We first examine existing isolation proposals.
4.1 Analysis of existing isolation mechanisms
(1) Logical isolation aims at preventing attacks on phys-
ically shared branch predictor and only allows its owner to
access. This could take the form of adding some sort of
thread ID to each entry. For example, a PHT of a commercial
processor typically has around 4K entries and each being a
2-bit counter. Adding ASID information (12bit in an Intel
processor [23]) to every entry is a costly approach. However,
there still exists contention based attacks if the attacker can
discern whether its history has been evicted by victim branch.
Flushing the predictor completely upon context switches or
privilege changes is an alternative logical isolation mecha-
nism, which is named as Complete Flush in this paper. We
investigate its performance impacts on our evaluation plat-
form, which is described in details in Section 6.
N
o
rm
al
iz
e
d
 p
e
rf
o
rm
an
ce
 o
ve
rh
e
ad
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
flush-4M flush-8M flush-12M
Figure 1: Performance overhead of flushing branch predictor
on single-threaded processor. (flush-4M means the predictor is
flushed every 4 million cycles).
There are three interesting observations:
Observation 1: The performance impact of flush meth-
ods on single-threaded core is insignificant. For a 2GHz
single-threaded core, when the context switching frequency
is 250Hz (typical context-switching frequency in Linux), the
average performance loss of flushing predictors upon switch-
ing is less than 1% in comparison with the baseline (without
isolation) as shown in Figure 1. It indicates that the program
usually has enough time in each scheduled execution win-
dow to amortize the warm-up of branch predictor, which is
consistent with other findings [28].
Observation 2: The performance loss ofComplete Flush
on an SMT core gets worse since flushing from different
threads interfere with each other. Furthermore, Com-
plete Flush cannot prevent attacks on SMT cores. Figure
2 shows a significant increase in performance loss to flush in
an SMT core compared to a single-threaded core. Increasing
the number of threads causes more performance degradation.
And it cannot provide sufficient isolation to prevent sharing
and preemption of history from other hardware threads.
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Figure 2: Performance overhead of flushing branch history
on an SMT core.
Observation 3: At the cost of complex hardware im-
plementations, a more precise flush mechanism is better
but not sufficient. And this method may introduce new
security issue for PHT. It is tempting to think that if we
can replace a whole-structure flush with a more precise flush
mechanism, the performance degradation problem will be
solved. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case.
We have simulated a design in which each entry of branch
prediction resource is augmented with thread ID properly
managed to ensure only entries used by a particular thread
are flushed when the thread is swapped out. We show perfor-
mance comparison of such a more precise flush mechanism
(dubbed Precise Flush) vs the more basic variant (Complete
Flush) in Figure 3. We see that the performance loss does
reduce but remains elevated. Considering the extra storage
space and complexity involved to carry out the more precise
flush, it is hard to see this as a satisfactory solution, especially
for a 2-bit pattern history table. Furthermore, such a flush
mechanism still cannot protect against a contention based
attack.
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Figure 3: Comparison between Complete Flush and Precise
Flush in SMT-2 (Normalized to baseline without any mecha-
nism).
(2) Physical isolation means allocating separate branch ta-
bles for different threads and different privilege levels, which
aims at eliminating malicious contention and reuse. One ap-
proach is providing additional hardware resources to back up
(certain portions of) predictor table upon context switches [9].
And backed up table contents will be recovered for the thread
swapped in. Nevertheless, there exist two limits:
¬ Physical isolation is likely to incur non-trivial resource
overhead. A milder version of physical isolation could be part
of a solution with acceptable overheads. For instance, BRB
strives to keep a small (1-3KB) portion of the state backed
up [43]. ­ Constrained by hardware overhead, the number
of back up tables is limited. It is impossible for every thread
to have private history table. Then there may be attacks in
subsequent software programs using the same back up table.
4.2 Our design philosophy
Both flush-based logical and physical isolation mecha-
nisms have their own design space. A solution needs to sat-
isfy the following criteria to achieve a secure and yet practical
branch predictor design:
• Enabling isolation between different processes and dif-
ferent privilege spaces;
• Versatile to accommodate multiple branch predictors;
• Lightweight implementation to minimize changes to
existing branch predictors;
• Tolerance of interference between SMT hardware threads.
Instead of isolating based on the flush or separated re-
sources, we want to achieve isolation of the content in these
hardware tables with some lightweight processing using ran-
domization as follows.
• Content encoding:. We propose to use hardware-based
thread-private random numbers to encode the contents
of the branch predictor tables (both direction and desti-
nation histories). Specifically, the data is encoded (think
xor for now) with the key before written into the table
and decoded after read from the table. This process
is similar to the use of a key to encrypt data, where
the key is a hardware-generated thread-private random
number that changes periodically (upon context switch
or privilege changes). Such a mechanism obfuscates
the information adding difficulties to cross-process or
cross-privilege analysis and perception. It achieves a
similar protection effect of Precise Flush, but adds little
in terms of space or time overheads.
• Index encoding: In addition to entry encoding, we also
use randomization of indexes, which sets up additional
obstacles for an attacker in all three steps of locating,
priming, and probing the predictor. Index encoding also
requires little change to conventional branch predictor
designs and incurs low overheads.
5. LIGHTWEIGHT CONTENT ISOLATION
MECHANISMS
The general idea is straightforward: we transform both
index and table content with thread-private keys; these keys
change under certain conditions. We now discuss the imple-
mentation issues. We start with the example of BTB using
the xor operation as the encoding/decoding (XOR-BTB).
5.1 Implementation of XOR-BTB
Each active hardware thread context will be allocated a
thread-private random number as the key to encode or decode
information stored in the table, such as tag and target address.
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(a) Noisy-XOR-BTB (b) Noisy-XOR-PHT
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Update Target Address
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Figure 4: Microarchitecture implementation of content encoding and index encoding. The red modules are designed for
XOR-BP; the combination of red the green ones are for Noisy-XOR-BP. We take Gshare architecture as the example to describe
our design for PHT.
The simplest coding operation is XOR. (We will see later that
this can be exchanged for stronger isolation.)
Lookup: When predicting the target of a branch, the pro-
cessor usually employs partial PC bits to index the BTB and
compares the most significant bits of the PC with the tag of
each way. If a match is found, the target address saved in
the entry will be taken out as the target of the branch. In
XOR-BTB, the higher bits of the PC are XORed with the
Content Key for tag match (Figure 4 a). Finally, the stored
target address (0x40bc9f21) is XORed with the Content Key
to produce the actual predicted target (0x80004000). These
additional steps are shown in red in the figure.
When a different thread (i with key ki) executes a branch,
it will not obtain the original tag or target address updated
by thread j due to the difference in their keys. This provides
a logical isolation of the content of BTB among different
threads.
Update: In a typical out-of-order processor, when an in-
direct branch instruction reaches the stage of execution, the
actual destination will be compared to the predicted address.
If they are different, it is considered as a BTB misprediction
and the corresponding content in the BTB needs to be updated.
In XOR-BTB, both the tag and the target address are encoded
(XORed with the thread’s content key) before saved in the
BTB. In Figure 4 (a), the actual target address 0x80004000 is
XORed with the current content key (0xacbcdf21) to produce
the encrypted address 0x40bc9f21, which is stored in the
BTB.
Note that in XOR-BTB, the tag of BTB is also encoded
lest an attacker could use performance counters as a covert
channel to sense possible resource contention [11]. For in-
stance, Intel processors provide BTB-related performance
counters [20], enabling an attacker to observe the case which
hits the BTB but has a misprediction due to incorrect address.
5.2 Extending to other tables or predictors
The general idea discussed above is applicable to any table
structure in a branch predictor regardless of the specific algo-
rithm involved and the detailed organization of the underlying
tables. Also note that the encoding and decoding operations
need not even be done on a single logical entry of the table.
PHT
Hash
Branch_PC
GHR
Update validBROB
Content Keys per-thread
FSM
2-bit 
counter0
2-bit 
counter1
2-bit 
counter15
16 × 2-bit saturating counters 
Key0 Key1 Key2 Key15
Figure 5: Microarchitecture implementation of Enhanced-
XOR-PHT.
For instance, in a simple 2-bit PHT, a logical entry contains
only two bits. Using XOR on these two bits (XOR-PHT)
may not yield sufficient obfuscation (Figure 4(b)). Instead,
the encoding and decoding can operate on word basis of an
arbitrary length, regardless of the logical meaning of bits
(Enhanced-XOR-PHT). For instance, shown in Figure 5, a
4K-entry PHT with 2-bits per entry can be considered as a
256-entry array of 32-bit words. We could then encode and
decode these 32-bits word using 32-bit keys. Indeed, the
physical implementation of the table using SRAM is most
likely using a wider row already. An alternative view of this
issue is that different logical entries nearby in the PHT can
use different keys for encoding/decoding.
Update: After the branch instruction is committed, the
saturating counter needs to be updated, whether the results of
prediction is correct or not. There are two typical ways for
such an update depending whether a branch reorder buffer
(BROB) is used to store the counter value.
• If a BROB is used, we take the counter value from the
buffer, update it, encode the updated value with the key,
and store it to PHT;
• If not, the original counter needs to be read out of
the PHT (and decoded) first before being updated, re-
encoded, and written back.
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5.3 Randomized index
The content randomization mechanism encrypts branch
history contents, but the history information still resides at
predictable locations in the tables. We propose to add index
randomization (Noisy-XOR-BP) which can further increase
the noise and help thwart attacks like contention-based ones.
As discussed earlier in Section 2, an attacker would first lo-
cate the entry corresponding to the branch predictor (Locate
phase) of the target branch instruction, and then train or ana-
lyze the corresponding entry at the Prime and Probe phases.
An important prerequisite for this process is that an attacker
can locate the entry based on the address of the branch in-
struction. That is, the indexing mechanism of the existing
branch predictor is relatively fixed, which gives an attacker
the opportunity to pinpoint.
The purpose of the Noisy-XOR-BP mechanism is to break
the simple and fixed indexing mechanism of existing branch
predictors. Like XOR-BP, Noisy-XOR-BP dynamically as-
signs another random index key private to each thread. The
index key is XORed with the lower part of the PC to gener-
ate the index whenever there is any table lookup (green part
in Figure 4). Since only the encoded index is used for ac-
tual table lookup, a contention-based attack will only obtain
information of the encoded index.
Note that this index key must be updated in a timely man-
ner. Otherwise, an attacker would still have the opportunity
to eventually construct branches which shares the same index
as the target branch of victim. In the subsequent description,
both Noisy-XOR-BTB and Noisy-XOR-PHT include content
and index encoding. In particular, Noisy-XOR-PHT encodes
content with Enhanced-XOR-PHT mechanism.
In terms of the thread-private random number, the genera-
tion, updating, and exception handling are the same with that
used in content randomization. In practice, the hardware ran-
dom number generator can generate a single random number
whose different (possibly overlapping) portions are used as
keys in content and index randomization.
5.4 Implementation issues
The isolation of content in our design depends on the se-
curity of the key. We need to prevent information leakage
not only between different programs, but also between dif-
ferent privilege levels (such as user mode and kernel mode)
when running the same program. Thus when a new thread
is switched in or when the thread’s privilege level changes,
we change the key as follows: We use a dedicated hardware
register per hardware thread to record the key. Such a thread
private register is invisible to software. Once a context switch
or a privilege switch occurs, a new random number will be
generated and updated to this private register. All subsequent
accesses would use the updated key. Correspondingly, OS
and hypervisor also have their own keys. Since there are many
mature methods for hardware random generation [19,30], we
assume these random numbers can be generated using a dedi-
cated hardware mechanism.
Now consider the SBPA attack on BTB as an example.
The attacker first primes target addresses of a certain set
in BTB. These address are XORed with the current private
key of the attacker before stored in BTB. The attacker then
waits for context switch to allow the victim execution to
Table 1: Security comparison.
Defense Mechanism Single-threaded core SMT coreReuse Contention Reuse Contention
B
T
B
Complete Flush Defend Defend No Protection No Protection
Precise Flush Defend Defend Defend1 No Protection
XOR-BTB Defend Defend Mitigate No Protection
Noisy-XOR-BTB Defend Defend Defend Mitigate
PH
T
Complete Flush Defend Defend No Protection Defend
Precise Flush Defend Defend Defend No Protection2
XOR-PHT Mitigate Defend No Protection Defend
Enhanced-XOR-PHT Defend Defend Mitigate Defend
Noisy-XOR-PHT Defend Defend Mitigate Defend
1 Precise Flush needs thread ID, with which branches in different hardware thread cannot
use the others’ history.
2 Adding thread ID brings significant hardware overhead for PHT. Besides, there are con-
tention based attacks on SMT.
leave footprint in the prime set before context-switched back
for the Probe stage. At this point, the private key has be
automatically changed by the hardware. The result is that
the attack will sense misses in the BTB for all the primed
addresses regardless of whether the victim evicted any entry
in the set.
Finally, note that while we use XOR throughout the dis-
cussion, the only requirement for the encoding operation is
that they are easily reversible so that both encode and decode
operations are lightweight enough to not cause critical path
timing problems. Adding shifting and/or scrambling in the
process, or using small lookup tables are all possible options.
5.5 Security analysis
Table 1 summarizes the security of different isolation
mechanisms. Complete Flush and Precise Flush represent
two costly and rather impractical mechanisms. Yet, because
flushing only happens during context or privilege switches,
they still fail to protect against certain attacks in SMT cores.
In contrast, XOR-based isolation mechanisms are both more
secure and more light-weight than these flush-based mecha-
nisms. The specific analysis is detailed as below.
(1) Security of Noisy-XOR-BTB
In this analysis, we assume a BTB is W-way set associative
with S-bit set index and T-bit tag per entry. Three major
scenarios are analyzed.
Scenario 1: Reuse based attacks on single-threaded
and SMT cores can be defended. For a reuse-based at-
tack to work, the entry left by one party is being translated
in multiple ways before being used by another party, which
makes it exceedingly difficult to maintain controlled manip-
ulation. Take malicious training for example. The attacker
wants to lay traps in the BTB to direct the victim to a mean-
ingful location. First, these entries need to result in a BTB
hit to be even considered. For that the (partial) tag left by
the attacker has to match the encoded tag of a victim branch.
The chance for one entry to have a BTB hit is 1/2T . The
attacker can certainly lay many such traps, increasing the
overall probability to some degree. But there is a second
hurdle to clear: The content of the entry will need to lead to
a meaningful location, one that contains the malicious code.
Since the content is XORed with another unknown key, the
probability of leading the victim to a specific address is 1/2N ,
N being the number of address bits. Again, the attacker can
certainly prepare many such traps and extend the attack over
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many intervals. But overall, the chance of success is against
a very large denominator (2N+T ).
The general analysis applies to the case of an SMT core
as well. The slight advantage to an attacker there is that they
can continue to re-plant new traps in the BTB, whereas in
a single-threaded core, those entries are gradually evicted
and the attack strength reduces with time in a context switch
interval.
Scenario 2: Contention based attacks on single-threaded
cores can be defended. Since there are context switches be-
tween prime phase and probe phase, a thread’s own history
in the previous phase becomes unrecognizable in the latter
phase. Thus the attacker cannot sense the conflict caused by
the target branch.
Scenario 3: Contention based attacks on SMT cores
can be mitigated. In a contention-based attack carried out
on a conventional SMT core, an attack like Jump [12] can
observe evictions of its own entry in BTB and thus infer
the address of taken branch executed by the victim. In our
system, different hardware thread has different private key for
indexing. Without the key of the victim thread, the attacker
can no longer make the inference of the branch address.
However, it is conceivable to extend certain attacks such
as SBPA as follows. The attacker can prime the entire BTB
with its own entries and invoke single-step mode to force the
victim to execute a single branch of interest. Consequently,
the mere change in any BTB content indicates a BTB update
due to a taken branch. In such a hypothetical case, no encryp-
tion of content or the index of BTB can be of any help as the
attacker is only sensing the fact there is an update to BTB,
without any interest in the content or index of the update. We
note that this type of attack should be handled differently
altogether and is rather beyond the scope of this paper. We
only highlight one possible approach here to suggest that it
also can be thwarted. The attack described above reduces
the demand on the information content from the BTB (or
PHT) but relies on highly precise control of victim’s execu-
tion (a single branch). A reasonable counter measure is for
the system to detect extreme reduction of execution speed,
and subsequently bypass update of any microarchitectural
resources completely as these updates are unlikely to matter
for execution speed.
(2) Security of Noisy-XOR-PHT
As mentioned in Section 2, there is no contention based
attack in PHT because a branch history updates the older his-
tory, rather than eviction. Security for two typical scenarios
is analyzed as following.
Scenario 4: Reuse based attacks on single-threaded
cores can be defended. First, the attacker cannot manip-
ulate the victim deterministically to execute the wrong path
speculatively. Because the private key changes at each con-
text switch, the attacker cannot train the status to any de-
terministic direction for the target victim thread. Second,
Noisy-XOR-PHT poses strict requirements on attacks to per-
ceive the direction of target branch. An attacker can no longer
infer the direction through one Prime-Probe operation.
There is one corner case: if an attacker can find a ref-
erence branch which employs the same private key as the
target branch, and if this reference branch’s direction is easily
1 / * Shared p o i n t e r and f u n c t i o n * /
2 s t a t i c vo id (* p ) ( ) ; / / A f u n c t i o n p o i n t e r s h a r e d by
3 / / t h e a t t a c k e r t h r e a d and t h e v i c t i m t h r e a d
4 vo id s h a r e d _ i n t e r f a c e ( ) {
5 p ( ) ; / / E x e c u t i o n h i s t o r y i s r e c o r d e d i n BTB
6 }
7 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
8 / * A t t a c k e r Thread * /
9 { / / p p o i n t s t o a t t a c k e r _ f u n c t i o n ( ) i n a t t a c k e r t h r e a d
10 s h a r e d _ i n t e r f a c e ( ) ; / / T r a i n t o e x e c u t e a t t a c k e r ’ s p
11 c l f l u s h ( p ) ;
12 c l f l u s h (& s i d e _ l i n e ) ; / / FLUSH s i d e _ l i n e
13 s l e e p ( 1 ) ; / / Swi tch t o v i c t i m t h r e a d i n Line 22
14 a= s i d e _ l i n e ; / / Ass e s s t h e t ime t o RELOAD s i d e _ l i n e
15 }
16 vo id a t t a c k e r _ f u n c t i o n ( ) {
17 a= s i d e _ l i n e ; / / Leave o b s e r v a b l e t r a c e s
18 }
19 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
20 / * Vic t im Thread * /
21 { / / p p o i n t s t o v i c t i m _ f u n c t i o n ( ) i n v i c t i m t h r e a d
22 s h a r e d _ i n t e r f a c e ( ) ;
23 . . .
24 }
25 vo id v i c t i m _ f u n c t i o n ( ) {
26 a= s e c ;
27 }
Listing 1: PoC Code piece of BTB attacks.
known (e.g., it is biased), then the attacker can indirectly infer
the target branch’s direction. Finding such a reference branch
is easy if we use a simple XOR scheme with a fixed key width.
The root cause is the fixed mapping relationship between the
branch instruction address and content keys index within a
thread. Breaking this fixed mapping relationship can be done
in a number of relatively simple ways while still allowing
easy decoding for normal use. For instance, the index can be
selected from PC dynamically and shifted based on the index
key.
Scenario 5: Reuse based attacks on SMT cores can be
mitigated. In XOR-PHT, an attacker may obtain sensitive
information from analyzing the update sequences from target
branch only. With Noisy-XOR-PHT, the attacker needs to
traverse every entry. This traversal prolongs Prime-Probe
operation, resulting in the decrease of information leakage
bandwidth. Furthermore, signals, interrupts, and exceptions
are used for high resolution in existing attacks [12, 14, 28].
All of them involve kernel operation and thus the change of
private key, which defends attacks effectively.
(3) Attack & defense experiments
To evaluate the effectiveness of our mechanism, we conduct
experiments with proof-of-concept (PoC) attacks for BTB
and PHT respectively on our FPGA-based processor proto-
type (configuration is introduced in Section 6). The PoC
codes (detailed in Listing 1 and 2) proceed in a realistic sce-
nario: cross-thread, within the same address domain.
In our experiment, we repeat the attack 10000 iterations.
In the PHT attack, we consider 100 attempts of training as
one iteration. A successful attack means that the victim
branch jumps to the trained direction more than 90 times.
For the baseline processor without any defense mechanism,
the accuracy of training BTB and PHT is 96.5% and 97.2%,
respectively. The accuracy on an Intel E5-2697 v4 proces-
sor is higher than 99.9%. With XOR-based Isolation, the
accuracy of training both BTB and PHT decreases to less
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1 / * Shared f u n c t i o n * /
2 vo id s h a r e d _ i n t e r f a c e ( i n t i ) {
3 i f ( i < a r r a y _ s i z e ) / / A c c e s s i b l e t o a t t a c k e r and v i c t i m
4 a= s e c ;
5 e l s e
6 a= s i d e _ l i n e ; / / Leave o b s e r v a b l e t r a c e s
7 }
8 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
9 / * A t t a c k e r Thread * /
10 {
11 f o r ( i n t i = a r r a y _ s i z e ; i <2000+ a r r a y _ s i z e ; i ++) {
12 s h a r e d _ i n t e r f a c e ( i ) ; / / T r a i n Line 3 t o Not Taken
13 }
14
15 c l f l u s h (& a r r a y _ s i z e ) ;
16 c l f l u s h (& s i d e _ l i n e ) ; / / FLUSH s i d e _ l i n e
17
18 s l e e p ( 1 ) ; / / Swi tch t o v i c t i m t h r e a d t o Line 24
19 a= s i d e _ l i n e ; / / Ass e s s t h e t ime t o RELOAD s i d e _ l i n e
20 }
21 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
22 / * Vic t im Thread * /
23 {
24 . . .
25 s h a r e d _ i n t e r f a c e ( x ) ;
26 . . .
27 }
Listing 2: PoC Code piece of PHT attacks.
Table 2: OoO Processor Core Configurations.
Parameter ConfigurationsFPGA prototype Gem5 simulation
ISA RISC-V ALPHA
Frequency 2GHz 2.5GHz(FPGA runs at 50MHz)
Processor type 4-decode,4-issue, 8-decode,8-issue,4-commit 8-commit
Pipeline depth 10 stages 19 stages
ROB/LDQ/STQ 64/16/16 entries 352/128/72 entries
Issue Queue 20/16/10 (mem/int/flt) 120
BTB 256 × 2-way 1024 × 4-way
PHT
TAGE: 33 KB TAGE_SC_L: 66.6KB
6 × 4096 entries or LTAGE: 32KB
history length: or Tournament: 6.3KB
12, 27, 44, 63, 90, 130 or Gshare: 2KB
ITLB/DTLB 8/8 entries 64/64 entries
L1 ICache 32KB, 8-way, 64B line 32KB, 4-way, 64B line
L1 DCache 32KB, 8-way, 64B line 48KB, 4-way, 64B line
L2 Cache 1MB, 16-way, 64B line 512KB, 16-way,64B line
L3 Cache None 4MB, 32-way, 64B line
than 1%.1 In summary, our mechanism introduces effective
protection against these attacks.
6. EVALUATION
6.1 Methodology
We built an FPGA prototype based on the open-source
Berkeley Out-of-Order RISC-V processor (BOOM) as the
main platform for experimental analyses [6, 45]. The main
parameters of this system are shown in Table 2. On this
1The 1% apparently successful attacks stem from the limitations of
the RISCV experimental platform and software noises. For example,
we determine the success of attack by observing Flush+Reload
cache side channels. However, flushing a cache line precisely is not
supported in RISCV instruction set, so we employ evicting the whole
cache with large arrays. This presents false positive measurement
noises on successful attack. However, an adversary cannot exploit
these noises to construct attacks.
platform, we implemented the XOR-BP and Noisy-XOR-BP
mechanisms to evaluate the performance impacts. Since our
processor prototype does not yet support SMT or some branch
predictors, we also modeled an out-of-order SMT processor
using the cycle-level Gem5 simulator [8]. This SMT core is
modeled after the latest Intel Sunny Cove core [47] as shown
in Table 2. In addition to Gshare, we experimented with three
different branch predictors: Tournament [25], LTAGE [39],
and TAGE_SC_L [40]. The modifications of Tournament
and TAGE_SC_L predictor with Noisy-XOR-PHT are shown
in Figure 6. In configuring TAGE_SC_L, we increased the
size of the base and the loop predictor moderately as that
improves prediction accuracy in our benchmarks.
On the RISC-V based FPGA platform, we randomly se-
lected 12 combinations (case1 to case12 for the single-threaded
core in Table 3) from SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite [17],
each consisting of a target benchmark (first in the entry) and
a background benchmark (second in the entry) to build the
scenario of context switch. Using the train input set, we run
these combinations on the Linux operating system to evaluate
the performance by measuring the execution time of target
benchmark. Our Linux operating system uses the default
context switching frequency of 250Hz.
For the simulated SMT-2 platform, we randomly selected
12 pairs of applications from the SPEC CPU 2006 bench-
mark suite (column SMT-2 in Table 3) to run concurrently.
These benchmarks run in the mode of System Call Emulation
(SE) with the typical context-switching frequency in Linux.
Two billion instructions are used for warm-up, and then we
count the execution cycles of the next two billion instructions
executed by either thread.
Experimental setups with different isolation mechanisms
are named as follows:
Baseline: The original OoO processor using branch pre-
dictor without any isolation mechanism.
IsolationMechanism-nM: The name of corresponding iso-
lation mechanism is followed by the period of context switch
in cycles due to timer interrupt. The standard Linux switches
context every 4 milliseconds (or 8 million 2GHz CPU cy-
cles). For example, XOR-BP-8M represents XOR-BP when
the thread is switched every 8 million CPU cycles.
PredictorName-FlushMechanism: PredictorName repre-
sents the corresponding combination of branch predictor and
flush mechanism, which includes CF for Complete Flush and
PF for Precise Flush. For example, Gshare-CF represents a
processor using Gshare branch predictor and Complete Flush
isolation mechanism.
6.2 Evaluation on FPGA-based single-threaded
RISC-V core
6.2.1 XOR-BP performance impacts
When an application resumes its execution after being
swapped out and back again on Baseline, it will benefit from
its residual state in the BTB. With XOR-BTB mechanism,
however, each context switch results in a change of the con-
tent key. The branch predictor is thus unable to correctly
decode any residual state. This in general leads to a perfor-
mance loss relative to Baseline. Keep in mind, though, that
in some special cases, the loss of residual state can actually
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(a)  Noisy-XOR-PHT on Tournament predictor (b) Noisy-XOR-PHT on TAGE_SC_L predictor
Figure 6: Implementation of Noisy-XOR-PHT on two example predictors. All the tables here use the shared index key and
content key, and of course each table can also have their own index key and content key. (a) Tournament: the first level holds
11 bits of branch pattern history for up to 2048 branches. This 10-bit pattern picks from one of 2048 prediction counters. The
global predictor is an 8192-entry table of 2-bit saturating counters indexed by the path (or global) history of the last 12 branches.
The choice prediction, or chooser, is also an 8192-entry table of 2-bit prediction counters indexed by the path history. (b)
TAGE_SC_L: the TAGE component consists of a base predictor (16Kbits prediction, 4Kbits hysteresis), two bank-interleaved
tagged tables featuring respectively ten 12-bit, 1K-entry banks, and twenty 16-bit, 1K-entry banks. The respective tag widths are
8 and 11 bits, a 3000-bit global history length, a 27-bit global path length, sixteen 5-bit USEALT counters, a 19-bit counter
for monitoring the allocation policy. The loop predictor features 256 entries and is 4-way associative (256 x 52 bits). The
Multi-GEHL statistical corrector consists of seven GEHL-like components respectively indexed using the global conditional
branch history (two tables), the global history of the backward branches (two tables), an IMLI counter indexed table, another
IMLI-based GEHL predictor and three local history GEHL components respectively with 256-entry, 16-entry, and 16-entry local
history.
Table 3: Benchmark sets.
Test Number Single-threaded core SMT-2
case1 gcc+calculix zeusmp+lbm
case2 milc+povray zeusmp+dealII
case3 bzip2_source+soplex bwaves+milc
case4 namd+sphinx3 leslie3d+gromacs
case5 hmmer+GemsFDTD dealII+sjeng
case6 gobmk+libquantum gromacs+astar
case7 gromacs+GemsFDTD gobmk+h264ref
case8 mcf+astar libquantum+milc
case9 soplex+hmmer gobmk+gromacs
case10 libquantum+calculix milc+bzip2_source
case11 mcf+perlbench libquantum+omnetpp
case12 bwaves+namd zeusmp+gobmk
improve performance as we will see later. Below, we evaluate
the performance impacts of XOR-BTB, XOR-PHT, and their
combination at different context switching frequencies.
As shown in Figure 7, compared with Baseline, the average
performance loss of XOR-BTB is less than 0.2%. Noisy-XOR-
BTB, which adds randomized index, introduces no additional
performance loss. The highest performance loss can approach
1.0% from case6 (combination of gobmk and libquantum).
For the pair of gobmk and libquantum, there are many more
residual BTB entries (between 500 and 800 entries) upon
switching back – compared to, say, the namd and sphinx3 pair
of 30-300 entries. And these entries contributed to the high
prediction accuracy of BTB, which reaches 85.2% and 99.3%
while running on Baseline. For such cases, the effect of
flushing BTB (with key change) usually results in a noticeable
performance penalty.
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Figure 7: Performance overhead of XOR-BTB and Noisy-
XOR-BTB.
For case2 (the combination of milc and povray), flushing
the BTB has the unusual effect of actually improving the
execution speed. It turns out, while the miss rate of BTB
increases due to flushing, it helps to overturn some incorrect
direction predictions as the processor in our implementation
simply reverts to fall-through prediction when the target is
unavailable.
The performance overhead of XOR-PHT is shown in Fig-
ure 8, where we see that the average overhead is less than
1.1%. The performance loss decreases gradually with the in-
crease of the context switch interval. Following a key change,
the same thread would now face essentially randomized PHT
content. However, considering the 2-bit counter takes a short
amount of time to warm up, the average performance over-
head is relatively insignificant. For example, the static con-
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Figure 8: Performance overhead of XOR-PHT and Noisy-
XOR-PHT.
ditional branch instruction ratios of case1 (gcc+calculix) are
relatively high at 12.1% and 8.1% respectively and their ac-
curacy of PHT prediction are 90.1% and 94.0% respectively,
which explains that the performance loss of the combination
is the highest of our twelve cases. Another example is case7
of single-threaded execution. The proportions of static condi-
tional branch instructions are just 4.8% and 7.6% for gromacs
and GemsFDTD respectively, and the accuracy of PHT pre-
diction is 88.9% for gromacs, and thus every time the context
switches, gromacs will scratch the results of GemsFDTD
training, so the XOR-PHT mechanism has little impact on the
combination.
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Figure 9: Performance overhead of XOR-BP and Noisy-XOR-
BP.
When combining the protection on BTB and the direction
predictor, the performance impact is largely additive. The per-
formance impact of the resulting configuration Noisy-XOR-
BP is shown in Figure 9. Overall, the average performance
loss is less than 1.3%. The largest performance loss is about
2.5% (case1), largely due to cost in PHT isolation seen earlier.
Overall, the additional impact of the XOR de/encoding
mechanism is very small. And the main performance impact
comes from PHT isolation. It should be noted that this low
performance overhead is similar to the results shown in Fig-
ure 1, and that the flush-based approach is not expensive for
single-threaded core.
6.2.2 Breakdown of two types of switches
Take Noisy-XOR-BP-12M as an example, Table 4 shows
the number of privilege changes per million cycles. We found
that the number of privilege changes is much larger than the
Table 4: The number of privilege switches per million cycles.
Test Number of Test Number of
Number privilege switches Number privilege switches
case1 4.9 case7 1.7
case2 7.0 case8 2.0
case3 1.9 case9 1.8
case4 2.0 case10 2.7
case5 1.7 case11 3.5
case6 1.6 case12 1.9
number of context switches (0.08 per million cycles). Similar
phenomena can been observed in other cases. It is not difficult
to understand that in a time slice, the execution of the program
may incur multiple privilege changes due to system calls,
exception handling etc. This indicates that the main factor in
determining the impact of isolation may be the characteristics
of the program itself, not the timer interruption frequency
setting. This also explains one observation in Figure 9: As
the timer switch frequency changes, there is no significant
fluctuation in the performance loss of Noisy-XOR-BP for
most test cases.
6.3 Simulation-based evaluation on SMT cores
Figure 10 shows performance impacts of three defence
mechanisms (Complete flush, Precise flush, and Noisy-XOR-
BP) on four different branch predictors (Gshare, Tournament,
LTAGE, and TAGE-SC-L, with a measured baseline MPKI of
8.45, 5.17, 4.10, and 3.99 respectively). Each bar is showing
the performance degradation compared to the same predictor
without any protection. Three observations can be made.
1. There is a non-trivial range of performance impacts. In
some cases, the combination of application’s sensitiv-
ity to branch predictor behavior and the frequency of
key changes can result in more than 20% performance
degradation. But on an average, the performance cost
for protection, at a few percent, is quite reasonable.
2. Although there are exceptions, in general, Noisy-XOR-
BP incurs lower performance impact than both flush
mechanisms. Compared to complete flush, performance
loss due to Noisy-XOR-BP is 26 to 37% lower. Keep
in mind that the flush mechanisms are more costly to
implement, and provides less protection against attacks
than our proposal.
3. Systems with a more accurate predictor tends to show
more performance impact due to protection. But on
average, the increase is not dramatic: It goes from 2.3%
for the least accurate predictor to 4.9% to the most
accurate.
6.4 Hardware Cost Estimation
The XOR-BP and Noisy-XOR-BTB are implemented at
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) on RISC-V processor. Based
on TSMC 28nm technology, we use Synopsys ASIC design
flow and synthesis tools to assess the timing and area cost. Ta-
ble 5 shows the timing and area overhead of Noisy-XOR-BP
with different configurations. And the numbers are compared
with original BTB and PHT. It can be seen that Noisy-XOR-
BP has minor area and timing cost. For example, in case of
2-way BTB with 256 entries each way, the timing cost of
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Figure 10: Performance cost of three isolation mechanisms on four different predictors an SMT core. CF and PF refer to
complete and precise flush, respectively.
Noisy-XOR-BTB is increased by 0.94% and area cost is in-
creased by 0.15% (Synthesized with TT corner using Design
Compiler).
Table 5: Area and timing evaluation.
BTB (2w128 means 2-way with 128 entries in each way)
2w128 2w256 2w512
Timing 0.70% 0.94% 1.46%
Area 0.24% 0.15% 0.13%
PHT (TAGE Predictor)
1024 entries 2048 entries 4096 entries
per table per table per table
Timing 2.10% 1.98% 2.01%
Area 0.11% 0.09% 0.03%
7. RELATED WORK
7.1 Comparison with cache side channel at-
tacks
There are two type of cache side channels: contention
based channels and reuse based channels [31]. For contention
based channels, there is a meaningful map between addresses
and entries in the cache or table to allow the attacker to
achieve manipulation. Randomizing the mapping, therefore,
is one way to increase the barrier of attack. RPCache [44],
CEASER [33], and ScatterCache [46] all use some form of
randomization. For a reuse based channel, a typical attack
is the Flush+Reload [49]. Through flushing specific lines,
the attacker can force lengthy memory accesses on certain
addresses shared between the attacker and the victim. Coun-
termeasures to such attacks include limiting the use of flush
or de-correlate caching from demand access via Random Fill
Cache [31].
Unlike Cache, branch prediction tables need both index
and content encoding. The content encoding only affects the
accuracy of the branch predictor, not the correctness of the
programs.
7.2 Countermeasures for branch predictor at-
tacks
Several countermeasures have been proposed. First, we
can reduce information leakage through the side channel.
For instance, branches that conclude sensitive information
can be transformed into safe instructions that do not leave
a mark in the branch predictors [3]. Limiting performance
counter usage can reduce the information obtained by the at-
tacker [16]. InvisiSpec [48], SafeSpec [26], MuonTrap [37],
Conditional Speculation [29], Efficient Invisible Speculative
Execution [36], CleanupSpec [35], STT [50], ConTExT [38],
Speculative Data-Oblivious Execution [24] and SpecShield [7]
prevent speculative computation from generating visible mi-
croarchitectural state. Alternatively, Retpoline [42], FENCE [4,
5,22], and Context-Sensitive Fencing [41] mitigate the chance
that untrusted code is speculatively executed.
Second, the predictor table can be flushed to contain ran-
domized new results. Performing this by software during
context switch can bring non-trivial overhead [13]. Such
expensive operations can be limited to only the sensitive
processes [18]. The impact on performance and prediction
accuracy of flushing predictor table in hardware has been
studied [10, 32]. Not surprisingly, the longer the context
switch interval, the smaller the impacts. These observations
are consistent with ours.
Third, using more dedicated hardware is a general ap-
proach to isolate states from different processes. For example,
sensitive applications in SGX can be allocated with their own
branch predictor tables [14]. Earlier work on performance
improvement considered saving and restoring compressed
branch prediction information [9] or providing thread-private
branch predictors on SMT processors [34]. BRB is a proposal
to retain partial predictor state in on-chip SRAM to swap in
with context [43].
Finally, detecting (and subsequently freezing or killing)
malicious processes is a possible general defense mecha-
nism [14]. While some specific methods have been dis-
cussed [15], accurately detecting malicious processes remains
a difficult, not-yet-practical approach.
8. CONCLUSION
Branch prediction is crucial in modern high-performance
microprocessors. But the basic design that allows sharing of
branch predictors between threads leaves opportunities for
malicious training and perception.
Instead of traditional approaches based on flushing or us-
ing separate hardware resources, this paper explores isolation
of the content in hardware tables via (1) content and (2) in-
dex encoding. In content encoding, we use hardware-based
thread-private random numbers to encode both direction and
destination histories. With index encoding, we use a another
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thread-private random number as part of the input to com-
pute the index of the tables, disrupting the correspondence
between the branch instruction address and its table entry.
The combination of the actions achieves excellent logical
isolation of branch histories between threads and privilege
levels while adding little in terms of circuit area or delay of
critical circuit path.
Our evaluation using an FPGA-based RISC-V processor
prototype and additional auxiliary simulations demonstrate
that the proposed mechanism adds less than 5% slowdown
on average. Compared to flush-based protection mechanisms
that have less protection in SMT cores and can incur far more
circuit area, our design reduces performance penalty by about
20-50% depending on the branch predictor.
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